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not telling the truth. Testimony from the relation of a
third person to the event, even where the declarant is
known, cannot be subjected to such tests. Obviously, such
testimony is subject to every conceivable hearsay objection.
The view which the Maryland court seems to adopt in
the Bulluck case,18 whereby a witness may testify without
restriction as to an extrajudicial identification made by himself or another is not without support. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit and other state courts seem to have
adopted a similar rule.59 In view of the real dangers against
which the hearsay rule affords protection, and in view of
the fact that the hearsay statements of a declarant, offered
in evidence by a witness other than the declarant, may involve such dangers, one may seriously question the advisibility of admitting such evidence except, perhaps, where
the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the trial court,
in its discretion, determines that the situation creates such
necessity as justifies the use of such evidence.

Pre-Emption Of State Regulation And Constitutional
Exclusion - Regulation Of "Elevation"
In Interstate Commerce
Public Service Commission v. Western Maryland
Railway Company'
By ROBERT E. PowFF.
The Public Service Commission of Maryland, after conducting an oral hearing wherein it determined that it
had jurisdiction over the leasing of grain elevators under
the provisions of Article 78, Section 24(b) (1) and (3) and
58Supra, n. 53.
"CDI Carlo v. United States, 6 F. 2d 364 (2d Cir. 1925), cert. den., 268
U.S. 706 (1925) ; United States v. Forzano, 190 F. 2d 687 (2nd Cir. 1951) ;
United States v. Fox, 97 F. 2d 913 (2nd Cir. 1938). At least two state
courts have admitted, without comment, testimony as to an extrajudicial
identification made by another: State v. Findling, 123 Minn. 413, 144 N.W.
142 (1913) (county attorney permitted to testify as to an identification
made by a boy of eight) ; State v. Wilson, 38 Wash. 2d 593, 231 P. 2d 288
(1951) (Chief of Police permitted to testify as to an identification made
by the prosecuting witness). In Johnson v. State, 254 Wis. 320, 36 N.W.
2d 86 (1949), testimony of police officers as extrajudicial identification of
defendant, held not hearsay.
1 The Daily Record, Sept. 19, 1959 (Cir. Court of Baltimore City).
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Section 75(a) of the Annotated Code of Maryland, 2 issued
an order directing the General Counsel of the Commission
to apply for an injunction to restrain the Western Maryland Railway Company from leasing certain grain elevator
facilities, owned by the Railway, to the Louis Dreyfus Corporation, without first applying for and obtaining the approval of the Commission. Over 99% % of the grain passing through the facilities in question was moving in interstate or foreign commerce.
The Court found that Congress through the enactment
of Section 1(3) of the Interstate Commerce Act,' which
includes "elevation" in the definition of "transportation"
as used in the Act, and Section 1(4) of that Act,4 which
asserts the regulatory powers of Congress over facilities
used in transportation, had brought the regulation of facilities used for purposes of elevation within the jurisdiction
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and that the authority granted under that act was paramount, excluding
from the field the form of local regulation under which the
Public Service Commission of Maryland was asserting its
27

Mn. CODE (1957) Art. 78, §24(b) provides:
"Acts prohibited without prior authorization of COmmi8sion. - Hereafter, no public service company shall, without the prior authorization
of the Commission:
(1) Assign, lease or transfer any franchise or right thereunder or
enter into any agreement or contract materially affecting such
franchise or right;

(3) Abandon or discontinue in whole or in part the exercise of any
franchise or right;"
§75(a) provides:
"The Commission may require the continuance of any service rendered to the public by any public service company under any franchise, right, or permit after its expiration date, if any; and no service
under a franchise, right or per-nit shall be discontinued or abandoned
without the consent of the Commission, which shall be granted if the
Commission finds that the present or future public convenience and
necessity permits such discontinuance or abandonment."
849 U.S.C.A. (1959), §1(3) provides that:
"The term 'transportation' as used in this chapter shall include
locomotives, cars, and other vehicles, vessels, and all instrumentalities
and facilities of shipment or carriage, irrespective of ownership or
of any ... connection with the receipt, delivery, elevation, and transfer
in transit, ventilation, refrigeration or icing, storage, and handling of
property transported." [Emphasis added.]
'49 U.S.C.A. (1959), §1(4) provides that:
"It shall be the duty of every common carrier subject to this chapter
to provide and furnish transportationupon reasonable request therefor, and to establish through routes with other such carriers. ...
It shall be the duty of every such common carrier establishing through
routes to provide reasonable facilities for operating such routes
"
[Emphasis added.]
The above sections of the Interstate Commerce Act have been quoted by
the author from the 1959 Code. They are substantially the same as the
1951 Code under which the principal case was decided.
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jurisdiction. The Court was also of the opinion that, even
in the absence of the Congressional legislation, the burden
placed upon interstate activities of the Railway, through
application of the Maryland statute by the Commission
was of a "direct" nature and hence would be invalid under
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
I. PRE-EMPTION
It has long been established that, where Congress has
exercised its power in relation to a specific phase of interstate commerce, a state or local regulation will be held to
be inoperative if either it conflicts directly with the regulation of Congress, or intrudes into a field which Congress
meant to completely occupy by its legislation.5
In Union Pacific R.R. v. Updike Grain Company,6 the
Supreme Court discussed for the first time the effect of
Congress having placed "elevation" within the definition of
"transportation" in the Interstate Commerce Act. The
Court there sustained the lawfulness of allowances paid by
the Union Pacific to private elevator operators for performing services on its behalf, on the ground that "elevation"
was within the meaning of "transportation", which under
the Interstate Commerce Act the Railroad was required to
furnish and
must pay for when furnished for it by another
7
concern.
In Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Hardwick Elevator Company,8 the Supreme Court, in striking down a Minnesota
statute which required railroads to furnish care at terminal
points within a specified period of time and imposing a
penalty upon the railroads for failure to comply, ruled that
Congress had included "cars" in the definition of "transportation", and therefore, in requiring the carrier to furnish "transportation" on reasonable request therefore, it
had pre-empted the field to the exclusion of the Minnesota
5 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1824). Under the Interstate Commerce Act see: Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424 (1912) ; Chi. R. I. &c.
By. v. Hardwick Elevator Co., 226 U.S. 426 (1913) ; St. Louis, Iron Mt. &
S. Ry. v. Edwards, 227 U.S. 265 (1913); N.Y. Central R.R. v. Hudson
County, 227 U.S. 248 (1913); Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341
(1927) ; Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa F. R. Co., 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
For application of this doctrine under other statutes see: Cloverleaf C. v.
Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942) ; Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485
(1953) ; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955) ; Guss v. Utah
Labor Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957), noted 18 Md. L. Rev. 50 (1958) ; San Diego
Unions v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957) ; Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats,
353 U.S. 20 (1957).
6222 U.S. 215 (1911).
'See also: Interstate Com. Comm. v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U.S. 42 (1911);
Omaha Elevator Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 249 F. 827 (8th Cir. 1918).
8226 U.S. 426 (1913).
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legislature. The Court in concluding said "there can be no
divided authority over interstate commerce, and . . . the
regulations of Congress on that subject are supreme. '
Similarly, in N. Y. Central R.R. v. Hudson County,10
the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance of the Board
of Chosen Freeholders of New Jersey regulating ferries on
the ground that Congress had already exercised its regulatory power in the field by including "ferries" in the definition of "railroads" as used in Section 1(3) of the Interstate
Commerce Act.
It became clear from the preceding interpretations of
the definition of "transportation" as used in applying the
Interstate Commerce Act that Congress has delegated complete regulatory powers in regard to "elevation" to the
Interstate Commerce Commission. The effect of such delegation of powers is seen through a series of cases in which
the Supreme Court held invalid State legislation requiring
the transport of freight as soon as received by a common
carrier," imposing penalties for delay in delivery to consignees," regulating equipment used on trains carrying the
United States mail, 13 regulating equipment used on locomotives, 4 regulating the issuance, form and substance of
bills of lading, 5 regulating rates charged for elevation of
goods traveling in interstate commerce, 6 and requiring
transfer companies used by railroads in inter-terminal
transfer of interstate passengers and baggage to secure
certificates of convenience and necessity before they could
operate. 7 In each instance the Court held the respective
acts invalid on the grounds that they were regulatory measures in a field which Congress had occupied to the exclusion of the states.
The basic doctrines with reference to state exercise of
power over commerce were reviewed in Southern Ry. Co.
v. Reid," wherein the Court speaking through Mr. Justice
McKenna said:
"As to the extent of the power and the occasions for
its exercise, controversies have arisen, and in deciding
9 Ibid., 435.
"227 U.S. 248 (1913).
n Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424 (1913).
St. Louis, Iron Mt. & S. Ry. v. Edwards, 227 U.S. 265 (1913).
11Penna. R.R. Co. v. Pub. Service Comm., 250 U.S. 566 (1919).
" Napier v. Atlantic Coastline, 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
5Missouri Pacific v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341 (1927).
16Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
27 Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa F. R. Co., 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
Is222 U.S. 424, 434-435 (1913). The footnotes in this quotation are not
those of the Court, but were added by the author.
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which the power of the State over the general subject
of commerce has been divided into three classes: First,
those in which the power of the State is exclusive;' 9
second, those in which the States may act in the absence
of legislation by Congress;2" third, those in which the
action of Congress
is exclusive and the States cannot
'21
act at all."

To be complete, there should be added a fourth (the antithesis of "two" above) namely where the states may not
act (as to matters national in character) by reason of the
Commerce Clause, even though Congress has failed to
regulate;22 and a fifth, that even where the states are precluded from acting by reason of the Commerce Clause,
Congress can delegate to the states power to act or remove
any obstacle which may be thought to stem from its power.23
The Court in the instant case found that the attempted
exercise of power by the Public Service Commission in
Maryland fell under the third category set forth above,
in holding that Congress through the Interstate Commerce
Act intended to cover the field of regulating "elevation"
by bringing it within the definition of "transportation" 'as
used in the Interstate Commerce Act. However, the Court
11For discussion see: Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1824) ; Cooley v.

Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299 (U.S. 1851), conc.
op. of Mr. Justice Daniel, 325; Kidd v. 'Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888) ; Diamond
Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co., 187 U.S. 611, 616 (1903) ; Oliver Iron
Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923). There is some question today as to whether
there actually Is a phase of commerce wherein the regulatory power of
the states is exclusive. See: Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
2°California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941); Cooley v. Board of
Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299 (U.S. 1851) ; Morgan v.
Louisiana, 118 U.S. 455 (1886) ; License Cases, 5 How. 504 (U.S. 1847) ;
Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187 (1912); Ore.-Washington Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87, 101 (1926). In relation to this doctrine,
it has been stated that state regulations of commerce should be sustained
unless Congress has clearly spoken to the contrary. See the dissents by
Mr. Justice Black in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945),
di8. op. 784, 789; Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), dis. op.
545; McCarroll v. Dixie Lines, 309 U.S. 176 (1939), dis. op. 183; and also
the dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 8upra,
di8. op. 795.
" Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957), noted 18 Md. L. Rev. 50
(1958) ; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1824) ; Chi, R. I. &c. Ry. v.
Hardwick Elevator Co., 226 U.S. 265 (1913) ; N.Y. Central R.R. v. Hudson
County, 227 U.S. 248 (1913); Missouri Pacific v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341
(1927) ; Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa F. R. Co., 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
2 Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299, 318
(U.S. 1851) ; Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925) ; Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927) ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761
(1945) ; and Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
2 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, ibid., 769; citing inter alia Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 238 U.S. 190, 198 (1915) ; Ky. Whip & Collar Co. v.
I. C. R. Co., 299 U.S. 334, 350, 351 (1937) and Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431
(1936). See also: Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
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also ruled that, even if Congress had not so pre-empted
the field, the provisions of the Public Service Commission
Law of Maryland asserting regulatory jurisdiction over the
leasing of franchise rights of common carriers was unconstitutional on the grounds that it placed a "direct burden"
on interstate commerce.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL EXCLUSION

In regard to this latter ruling, the trial court said: "It
has long been held that if state regulation imposes a direct
burden upon interstate commerce, such regulation must fall
regardless of Federal legislation",24 thereby applying the
so-called "direct burden" test which the Supreme Court has
used in a number of cases to test the constitutionality of
state regulations of commerce.2 5 The "direct burden" test
is but one of several approaches used by the court in applying the basic doctrine, stemming from Cooley v. Board of
2 6 that where subjects of
Wardens of Port of Philadelphia,
regulation demand that their regulation, if any, be prescribed by a single authority, the states may not act at all,
but where the subjects of regulation are essentially local
in character, not requiring uniformity of control, the states
may act (at least until Congress pre-empts the field).27
The other principle approaches used by the Court have
been: (1) to weigh all of the circumstances surrounding
each attempted state or local regulation in regard to the
state and national interests involved to determine whether
the need for interstate commerce to be free and untrammeled out-weighs the local interest in the type of regulation involved regardless of its nature;2 (2) to strike down
2The Daily Record, Sept. 19, 1958 (Cir. Ct. of Baltimore City). [Emphasis
added.]
= Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1917), which speaks
the language of "direct burden" but "weighs" all the facts as under Mr.
Justice Stone's "weighing" approach, infra, circa, ns. 39-46; Buck v.
Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925) ; Bush Co. v. Maloy, 267 U.S. 317 (1925) ;
Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 (1925) ; Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927), overruled In California v. Thompson, 313 U.S.
109 (1941), discussed in 41 Col. L. Rev. 1104 (1941) ; Hood & Sons v.
Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), noted 37 Cal. L. Rev. 667 (1949), 35 Corn.
L. Q. 211 (1949), 34 Minn. L. Rev. 60 (1949) and 3 Vand. L. Rev. 113 (1949).
212
How. 299, 319 (U.S. 1851).
Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940) ; Welch Co. v. New Hampshire,
306 U.S. 79 (1939). The problem involved with the Cooley doctrine is that
the two areas of regulation overlap, and the definition of those areas
depends upon which power, state or federal, is stressed. As a result the
Court has from time to time sought more specific tests in order to better
define the area left over to state control.
8California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941), noted 41 Col. L. Rev. 1104
(1941) ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); and Mr.
Justice Stone's dissent in Di Santo v. Thompson, 273 U.S. 34 (1927), dis.
op. 43, 44, all discussed infra, circa, ns. 41-43, 45-51.
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all regulations (or taxes) which on their face or by necessary operation discriminate against interstate commerce
(the one approach which has been consistently accepted by
the Court);29 and (3) in the absence of discrimination
against interstate commerce, to accept state and local police
regulations as valid unless expressly denounced by congressional legislation." The third approach has been espoused vigorously by Justices Black and Douglas, but never
accepted by a majority of the Court.
Support for the use of the "direct burden" approach in
the instant case is seen in Bush Company v. Maloy5 ' and
Buck v. Kuykendall,32 both of which were decided on the
same day in 1925, and in the fairly recent case of Hood &
Sons v. Du Mond.3 3 In the first two cases the Supreme
Court struck down statutes of Maryland and Washington
which required common carriers for hire to obtain a permit, in the nature of a certificate of convenience and necessity which could be denied on the basis of adequate existing
service, as a prerequisite to the operation of interstate
business which required the use of the highways of the
respective states. In the third case a New York statute
forbidding dealers from buying milk from producers without first obtaining a license, which would not be granted if
the activity of the dealer would tend toward destructive
competition, was found to be unconstitutional on the ground
that the requirement established an economic barrier
2'Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison,
340 U.S. 349 (1951). The same doctrine has been applied in the analogous
field of state taxation of Interstate commerce. Minnesota v. Blasius, 290
U.S. 1, 8 (1933) ; McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1939),
wherein the Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice Stone upheld the
validity of a New York Sales Tax as applied to goods coming into the state
through interstate commerce and being sold therein. The Court in discussing
discriminatory taxes said:
"Certain types of tax may, If permitted at all, so readily be made
the instrument of impeding or destroying interstate commerce as
plainly to call for their condemnation as forbidden regulations. Such
are the taxes . . . which are aimed at or discriminate against the
commerce or impose a levy for the privilege of doing it, or tax interstate transportation or communication or their gross earnings, or levy
an exaction on merchandise in the course of its interstate journey" [48].
8oMcCarroll v. Dixie Lines, 309 U.S. 176 (1939), dis. op. 183, 189; Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), dis. opa. 784, 789, 795; Hood
& Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), dis. op. 545, 563, 564; see infra,
circa, ns. 47-48.
m267 U.S. 317 (1925).
a1267 U.S. 307 (1925). For similar cases involving the Public Service
Commission of Maryland but not necessarily reaching a like conclusion see:
Pub. Serv. Comm'n. v. Gas Etc. Corp., 162 Md. 298, 159 A. 758 (1932) ; Pub.
Serv. Comm'n. v. Rwy. Co., 146 Md. 580, 127 A. 112 (1924). See also:
Penna. R.R. Co. v. Public Serv. Com., 126 Md. 59, 94 A. 330 (1915).
8336 U.S. 525 (1949), noted 37 Cal. L. Rev. 667 (1949) ; 35 Corn. L. Q.
211 (1949), 34 Minn. L. Rev. 60 (1949), 3 Vand. L. Rev. 113 (1949).
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against competition, and therefore, placed a "direct burden"
upon interstate commerce.
In each of the above cases, it is interesting to note that
the regulation was an economic or business type control
related to adequacy of service to the public and the hazard
of additional competition (a utility-type regulation sustained originally against due process objection only by
special justification) 4 and hence could be said to be directed
at or a "direct burden" on the business itself. This is distinguished from the normal type of regulation which could
be said to be directed at health, safety or morals and only
an indirect burden on any business involved, a distinction
which was emphasized by the court in Hood & Sons v.
Du Mond in comparing the result of that case with Milk
Control Board v. Eisenberg,wherein the court had sustained
a somewhat similar statute licensing dealers in milk. 5
In dealing with commerce clause objections to state
statutes controlling health, safety, morals, and related areas
where state power to act has for years been easily sustained as against due process objection, the court has found
it easy to state that these are matters of purely local concern which only indirectly affect interstate commerce.
Thus, non-discriminatory state laws have been sustained in
regard to the weight, size, width, and height of vehicles
operating on its highways, 6 imposing taxes to defer costs
of highway construction and maintenance,87 and providing
",See also: Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) ; German Alliance Ins.
Company v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389 (1914) ; Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350
(1928) ; but, this doctrine of need to show business affected with a public
interest to sustain certification or price control was abandoned in Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), Cf. Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co.,
335 U.S. 525, 535-536 (1949) ; 47 Harv. L. Rev. 130 (1933). For further discussion in the motor carrier area, see Brown and Scott, Regulation of the
Contract Motor Carrierunder the Constitution,44 Harv. L. Rev. 530 (1931)
Michigan Commission v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570, 578 (1925).
Supra n. 33, 530-53i; Milk Board v. Eisenberg Co., 306 U.S. 346, 352-353
(1939). In the Eisenberg case, sustaining provisions of a statute requiring
license, bond, and regulation of prices to be paid to producers, the Court
found that their purpose "obviously is to reach a domestic situation in the
interest of the welfare of the producers and consumers" [352] and their
effect on interstate commerce is "incidental and not forbidden by the Constitution, in the absence of regulation by Congress" [353]. Construing this
in the Hood case, the Court indicated that New York's "regulations,
designed to assure purchasers a fair price and a responsible purchaser, and
consumers a sanitary and modernly equipped handler, are not challenged . . . . [O]nly additional restrictions, imposed for 'the avowed purpose and with the practical effect of curtailing the volume of interstate
commerce to aid local economic interests . . . are in question" [531-2].
S. C. Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); Sproles v.
Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932) ; Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135 (1927) ; and
Bradley v. Pub. Util. Comm'n., 289 U.S. 92 (1933).
'Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915); Kane v. New Jersey, 242
U.S. 160 (1916).
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for inspections or quarantine." In the development of doctrine such laws met no serious difficulty with the "direct
burden" test but were subject to objection under the Commerce Clause only if they placed too heavy a burden upon
interstate commerce,"9 or if they conflicted with pre-existing federal laws.40
Two cases, Di Santo v. Pennsylvania4 and California v.
Thompson,4 2 dealing with essentially the same problem, but
getting opposite results within fourteen years, well illustrate the extent to which the result in a given case may be
controlled by which one of the above referred to tests
is applied, and at the same time spell out the beginning of
Mr. Justice Stone's weighing approach as a dissenting
opinion and its later acceptance as a majority view. Using
the "direct burden" test in the Di Santo case, the Court
held invalid a Pennsylvania statute which required that
a license be obtained by all persons selling steamship tickets
or transportation to or from foreign countries, which license
was only to be granted after proof of good character and
fitness, and assessing a fee of fifty dollars to be paid by all
such persons. In addition the license was made revocable
for misbehavior on the part of the licensee. The majority of
the Court reasoned that this statute placed a direct economic burden upon interstate and foreign commerce, and
therefore, could not be sustained under the Commerce
Clause.
Mr. Justice Stone, with whom Justices Brandeis and
Holmes concurred, delivered a strong dissent disagreeing
with the test used by the court in striking down the Pennsylvania statute. He said:
"In this case the traditional test of the limit of state
action by inquiring whether the interference with commerce is direct or indirectseems to me too mechanical,
too uncertain in its application, and too remote from
actualities, to be of value. In thus making use of the
expressions 'direct' and 'indirect interference' with
commerce, we are doing little more than using labels
to describe a result rather 4' than any trustworthy formula by which it is reached. 3
81Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933) ; Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S.

41 (1921) ; Kelley v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937).

See also 33 Col. L. Rev.

1063 (1933).

Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925) ; Bush Co. v. Maloy, 267 U.S.
317 (1925).
1 Penna. R.R. Co. v. Pub. Service Comm., 250 U.S. 566 (1910) ; Napier
v. Atlantic Coastline, 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
"273 U.S. 34 (1927).
- 313 U.S. 109 (1941), noted 41 Col. L. Rev. 1104 (1941).
Supra, n. 41, di8. op. 43, 44.
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It was the opinion of Mr. Justice Stone that all of the circumstances surrounding the regulation and its application
should be weighed, before reaching a decision, namely the
nature and purpose of the regulation, the character of the
business involved, and the actual effect that the regulation
would have upon the flow of commerce. In his opinion this
"weighing approach" as applied to the Di Santo case would
have led to the conclusion that the regulation concerned
interests peculiarly local in nature and did not infringe upon
the national interest in maintaining the free flow of commerce (a result similar to that obtained in the Eisenberg
case) .
The effect of Mr. Justice Stone's dissent in the Di Santo
case is seen in the Court's decision in Californiav. Thompson 45 where the Court, applying the so-called "weighing
approach", upheld a California statute which required a
license and bond from transportation agents within the
state who negotiated for interstate bus transportation. The
Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Stone, said:
"Since the decision in [the Di Santo] case this Court
has been repeatedly called upon to examine the constitutionality of numerous local regulations affecting interstate motor vehicle traffic. It has uniformly
held that in the absence of pertinent Congressional
legislation there is constitutional power in the states
to regulate interestate commerce by motor vehicle
wherever it affects the safety of the public and convenient use of the highways, provided only that the
regulation does not in any other respect unnecessarily
obstruct interstate commerce."
"[The states] must be deemed to possess the power
to regulate the negotiations for such transportation
where they affect matters of local concern which are
in other respects within state regulatory powers, and
where the regulation does not infringe the national
interest in maintaining the free flow of commerce and
in preserving uniformity in the regulation
of the com46
merce in matters of national concern.
The opinion further stated that the Di Santo case was a
departure from this principle which had been recognized
47
since Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia.
"306 U.S. 346 (1939).
"313 U.S. 109 (1941).
"Ibid., 115-116. [Emphasis added.]
"112 How. 299 (U.S. 1851), see note 27, 8upra.
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The "weighing approach" came to full fruition in Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona,48 where the Court, again
speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Stone, held in a 7-2
decision that the Arizona Train Limit Law of 1912, which
prohibited the use of more than fourteen passenger cars or
seventy freight cars as a safety measure and imposing a
penalty for non-compliance, was legislation affecting subject matter which required national uniformity and was
of a nature which Congress alone could regulate under the
Commerce Clause, and therefore, the Arizona Law was unconstitutional. After summarizing prior law and doctrine,
Mr. Justice Stone enunciated and applied his "weighing
approach" in the following words:
.* . the matters for ultimate determination here
are the nature and extent of the burden which the state
regulation of interstate trains, adopted as a safety measure, imposes on interstate commerce, and whether the
relative weights of the state and national interests involved are such as to make inapplicable the rule, generally observed, that the free flow of interstate commerce and its freedom from local restraints in matters
requiring uniformity of regulation are interests safeguarded '4by
9 the Commerce Clause from state interference.
Justices Black and Douglas delivered separate dissenting opinions in which both took the view that in absence of
discrimination such legislation as under discussion should
be sustained until Congress should clearly speak to the contrary. The former strongly criticized the Arizona courts
and the Supreme Court for hearing and reviewing massive
evidence as to why the state legislature passed the Train
Limit Law and the necessity therefor. The Court, according to him, was acting as a "super-legislature" by determining a matter necessarily of public policy which "a century and a half of constitutional history admonishes this
Court to leave... to the elected legislative representatives
of the people themselves . . . ."0 Mr. Justice Douglas, also
dissenting, in enunciating essentially the same view, stated
that the doctrine should be ".... that the courts should intervene only where the state legislation discriminated against
interstate commerce or was out of harmony with laws
which Congress had enacted." 51
-8325 U.S. 761 (1945), noted 31 Va. L. Rev. 943 (1945).
Ibid., 770-771.
10Supra n. 48, dis. op. 784, 789.
51Supra n. 48, dis. op. 795.
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From the above decisions, it would appear that the majority of the Supreme Court after the Di Santo case, and
particularly during Chief Justice Stone's administration,
had shifted from the "direct-indirect" approach to the
"weighing approach" in determining the validity of state
regulations of commerce (although it is to be noted that
the cases did not involve so-called business or economic
controls, as distinguished from health, safety or morals
controls). However, the Court, except where discrimination against interstate commerce was manifest, remained
divided as to what test should properly be applied to administer the Cooley 2 doctrine, and four years later a 5-4
decision in Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 5 as earlier observed,
used the "direct burden" test to strike down a New York
statute which forbade dealers from purchasing milk from
producers without first obtaining a license, which would not
be granted if the activity of the dealer would tend toward
destructive competition. 4 The principle enunciated in that
case illustrates that the majority once again felt that any
legislation which has the effect of directly interfering with
the free market is per se bad. 5
As in Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona,56 two justices wrote dissenting opinions in the Hood & Sons case. 7
Mr. Justice Black took the position that the New York
regulation was a proper exercise of the police power of that
state, in that it had a right to protect local business from
dangerous competition. Furthermore, he could not find
that the New York regulation was discriminatory, and
therefore, in accordance with his views in Southern Pacific
Company v. Arizona, he was of the opinion that the state
statute should stand. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with whom
Mr. Justice Rutledge joined in dissenting, took the position
that the majority erred in not sufficiently weighing the
underlying factors, which gave rise to the New York statute,
to determine "whether or not the restriction of competition
among dealers in milk does in fact contribute to their eco"12

How. 299 (U.S. 1851).
336 U.S. 525 (1949), noted 37 Cal. L. Rev. 667 (1949), 35 Corn. L. Q.
211 (1949), 34 Minn. L. Rev. 60 (1949), 3 Vand. L. Rev. 113 (1949).
"Supra, circa, us. 33-35.
MThe doctrines used by the Court in the preceding cases are substantially
the same as those applied in state taxation and labor disputes affecting
interstate commerce. Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933) ; McGoldrick
v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940), supra, circa, n. 29; Freeman v.
Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946) ; Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957),
noted 18 Md. L. Rev. 50 (1958). See also: 47 Col. L. Rev. 211 (1947) ; 54
Col. L. Rev. 261 (1954).
"325 U.S. 761 (1945), di8. op8. 784, 795, noted 31 Va. L. Rev. 943 (1945).
"336 U.S. 525 (1949), dis. ops. 545, 564, noted as Indicated, supra n. 53.
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nomic well-being and, through them, to that of the entire
industry.""8
There can be no question but that the operation and
maintenance of a grain elevator is essential to the free flow
of interstate and foreign commerce, and that the regulation, under which the Public Service Commission of Maryland asserted its jurisdiction in the instant case, was an
economic control and in that sense placed a direct burden
upon such commerce, as found by the trial court. The only
problem is in determining whether the Court was correct
in using the "direct burden" doctrinal approach for testing
the constitutionality of local regulations of commerce, or
whether it should have used the weighing approach of
Mr. Justice Stone. Since it is not clear what approach
would prevail on the Court today, there is no clear prediction possible as to what the Supreme Court would rule as
to the applicable test, or even as to how far a state may
go in regulating commerce in any particular manner.
The cases discussed above would seem to indicate that
the result reached by the trial court in the instant decision
was correct and that the test chosen was the one which the
majority of the Supreme Court has followed in several cases
raising commerce clause objections to state economic controls placed on business. On the other hand, it would seem
that at the time of Southern Pacific v. Arizona, Mr. Chief
Justice Stone had assembled a clear majority in favor of his
"weighing" approach which he felt should supersede and
replace all others. A survey of the cases, however, with
the majority shifting from time to time as to the test to be
used, leaves this writer in doubt as to what might be expected from the present Supreme Court.
" [W] ere we writing on a clean slate",5 9 this writer would
find the simplest, if not the best, test to be that of Mr. Justice Black of sustaining all non-discriminatory state regulations until Congress either expressly denounces the regulatory measure or supersedes it by imposing its own. It could
be argued that the Court should adopt this view as being
most consistent with that which it has espoused in handling
objections to state regulations under the Due Process
Clause, namely that ".... it is for the legislature, not the
courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of [a]
new requirement". 0 As Mr. Justice Black might urge, it
-Ibid., 564, 573.
Borrowing a phrase from Mr. Justice Frankfurter - see Galvan v.
Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954).
10Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955). See also:
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) ; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937); DayoBrite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421
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would only be leaving to Congress the legislative task of
asserting clearly when national regulations exclude state
controls, and also when state controls have intruded where
Congress feels uniform freedom from control is required.
However, until some clearer pronouncement from Congress, or the Court, occurs, the difficulty of choosing the
applicable test from outstanding majority opinions so as
to predict the validity of any future state regulation is illustrated by the generality of the conclusion recently drawn
by Professor Thomas Reed Powell, ". . . that one might
safely say that the states may regulate commerce some,
but not too much"."'

The Maryland Version Of The Uniform Post Conviction
Procedure Act, With Special Reference To
The Writ Of Habeas Corpus'
Maryland's adoption of the Uniform Post Conviction
Procedure Act is an attempt to limit the ever-increasing
case load of the Court of Appeals by reducing the number
of appeals arising from repeated collateral attacks on criminal convictions. At the same time it attempts to preserve,
within clearly defined limits, appellate review for persons
who are allegedly illegally imprisoned.2 The Maryland
Act is substantially the same as the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act.' There is, however, one important
difference. The Uniform Act applies to all collateral proceedings to test the legality of incarceration both in lower
(1952); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). The repudiation of a
jurisprudence of formulas in the above cases, as in the area with respect
to the extent of the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause (see
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123-124 (1942) would indicate the ultimate
weakness in this area of the "direct burden" nomenclature.
61POWVLL, VAGARIES AND VARIMIIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRELTATION
(1956) 178. Professor Powell, after voicing the cited conclusion, then said:
"Once I asked Mr. Justice Holmes why counsel should not give up
prating about national and local, uniformity and diversity, and tell
the court that the law is free for a decision either way, and then add:
'I propose to confine myself to practical consideration why my way Is
wiser than my opponent's way.' He remarked: 'I wish to God they
would'." Ibid.
13 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1958) Art. 27, §§645 A-645 J, as amended by

1959, Ch. 429, effective June 1, 1959, hereinafter referred to as
"The Act". All references are to the Act as amended.
2 The Act accomplishes more than
merely discouraging repetitious and
frivolous claims for relief; in general It sets forth a more orderly and
workable procedure than has heretofore been available in Maryland.
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(1957) 352, §§1-14. According to the

annotations as of July, 1959, one other state, Arkansas, had adopted this
Uniform Act. AmK. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1957) Art. 43, §§3101-3110.

